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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred by Refusing to Give One of the Requested Jury 
Instructions Regarding Constructive Possession and by Denying Mr. Bennett's 
Motion for a New Trial 
In his Opening Brief Mr. Bennett explained how the district court erred in denying his 
requested instructions regarding constructive possession of contraband and that the district court 
should have granted his motions for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29. 
In response, the State argues the pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions ("ICJI") regarding 
possession adequately instructed the jury. The State also argues there was sufficient evidence 
produced at trial that would allow a jury to reasonably conclude Mr. Bennett knew of the 
methamphetamine he was in proximity to and that he either actually possessed the substance or 
had the power and intention to control it. 
1. Mr. Bennett was entitled to have one of his requested jury instructions given 
Both parties agree this Court exercises free review of whether or not Mr. Bennett's jury 
was fairly and adequately instructed on the law. Opening Brief, pp. 9-10 & Respondent's Brief 
p. 9. Though the State fails to acknowledge such, it is also undisputed that by statute each party 
is permitted to request specific instructions so long as they are "correct and pertinent." LC. § 19-
2132. Furthermore, when requested, a jury instruction must be given if it is an accurate 
statement of the law, not adequately covered by the other jury instructions, and supported by a 
reasonable view of the evidence. State v. Spurr, 114 Idaho 277, 755 P.2d 1315 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The State apparently concedes that the jury instructions requested by Mr. Bennett are accurate 
statements of the law and supported by a reasonable view of the evidence since the Respondent's 
1 
Brief is silent as to both of these issues. Therefore, the only contested issue is whether Mr. 
Bennett's requested jury instructions were adequately covered by the other jury instructions. 
Accordingly, citing State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 900 P.2d 1367 (1995), the State 
asserts Mr. Bennett's requested instructions regarding constructive possession were not 
necessary because "ICJI makes it clear that a defendant's mere presence is not enough to prove 
possession." Respondent's Brief, p. 10. In his Opening Brief Mr. Bennett explained, at length, 
why any reliance upon the dictum in Seitter is misplaced and more importantly how Seitter 
actually supports Mr. Bennett's position by acknowledging that when a instruction "more 
adequately, accurately, or clearly states the law" it should be given. Opening Brief, pp. 13-15; 
Seitter, 127 Idaho at 360,900 P.2d at 1371. The State provided no response to Mr. Bennett's 
argument in this regard. 
The State also makes no other substantive argument as to why the district court should 
not have given one of Mr. Bennett's requested instructions. Perhaps this is because "a defendant 
is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor." Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 
(1988); see also United States v. Yarbrough, 852, F.2d 1522, 1541 (1988) (it is "well established 
that a criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on any defense which provides a 
legal defense to the charge against him and which has some foundation in the evidence, even 
though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility"). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the same, stating a "defendant in a criminal action is 
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entitled to have [the defendant's] legal theory of the case submitted to the jury under proper 
instructions." State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 880-81, 736 P.2d 1327, 1334-35 (1987). 
There can be no denying Mr. Bennett's legal theory at trial, which is supported by the law 
in Idaho, that mere proximity to contraband is not sufficient to show control over the contraband. 
Contrary to the State's argument, this theory was not adequately covered by the instructions 
already given. ICJI 421 does not address closeness or nearness to contraband. ICJI 421 speaks 
to actual possession ("physical control of it") or alternatively to "the power and intention to 
control" the contraband at issue. ICJI 421 does not instruct the jury or provide guidance as to the 
law when, as is the case here, someone is simply found in close proximity to contraband. 
Mr. Bennett's proposed jury instructions, especially his second proposed instruction, 
were correct and pertinent. Moreover, Mr. Bennett's proposed jury instructions more accurately 
and clearly state the law of constructive possession and whether mere proximity to contraband is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction. More importantly, Mr. Bennett's proposed jury instructions 
clearly stated his legal theory at trial. As a result, the district court's failure to give one of the 
requested instructions was error. 
2. The Court erred in denying Mr. Bennett's motion for a new trial 
The State, in its Respondent's Brief, failed to address or respond to Mr. Bennett's 
argument that the district court's denial of his Motion for a New Trial was in error. As such, no 
reply is warranted. 
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B. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support Mr. Bennett's Convictions and 
Therefore the District Court Erred in Denying His Motions for a Judgment of 
Acquittal 
In his Opening Brief Mr. Bennett conceded the State at trial established his proximity to 
the illegal contraband and therefore, under the applicable jurisprudence regarding constructive 
possession, a reasonable inference existed supporting Mr. Bennett's knowledge of the 
contraband's presence. Mr. Bennett also explained however that because he was not the sole 
occupant of the premises where the contraband was found the State was required to establish that 
he personally exercised control over the contraband. Mr. Bennett then went on to compare and 
contrast the facts of this case with much of the existing Idaho appellate decisions regarding 
constructive possession. 
To the contrary, in its Respondent's Brief, the State quotes State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 
592, 944 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1997) for a definition of constructive possession, recites some 
of the evidence produced at trial, and then in a rather conclusory fashion asserts there was 
substantial evidence whereby a jury could reasonably conclude Mr. Bennett either actually 
possessed the contraband at issue or had the power and intention to control those items. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 8. The State makes no effort to explain how this case is at all 
distinguishable from State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 861 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1993) or State v. 
Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986) where the Court of Appeals reversed 
judgments of convictions because there was insufficient evidence of constructive possession. 
Nor does the State attempt to address any of the other Idaho appellate jurisprudence in this area 
of law. 
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The only evidence produced at trial regarding Mr. Bennett's possession of contraband, 
whether actual or constructive, was that he was in proximity to the contraband and that it was 
found near or among some men's toiletries atop a dresser. There was no evidence regarding who 
placed the contraband there or that Mr. Bennett intended to exercise control over it. When more 
than one occupant occupies an area where contraband is found, the State must produce evidence 
showing that someone, individually, exercised control over the contraband. See Maland, 124 
Idaho at 542, 861 P.2d at 112; and Vinton, 110 Idaho at 834, 718 P.2d at 1272. The evidence 
produced in this case is simply insufficient to establish constructive possession by Mr. Bennett. 
As such, his convictions should be reversed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Bennett's Opening Brief, this Court should 
vacate his judgments of conviction and sentences. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of May 2014. 
Jef o son 
Att mey for Barclay Bennett 
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